Job-Searching and Job-Matching in a Two-Sector General Equilibrium Model by Bandopadhyay, Titas Kumar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Job-Searching and Job-Matching in a
Two-Sector General Equilibrium Model
Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay
2. October 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59039/
MPRA Paper No. 59039, posted 28. October 2014 20:37 UTC
1Job-Searching and Job-Matching in a Two-Sector General Equilibrium
Model
Titaskumar Bandyopadhyay
Bagnan College, Bagnan, Howrah
Abstract: We extend the benchmark model of DMP in a two-sector general equilibrium
framework by introducing a frictionless segment of the labour market. We also examine
the effects of trade reforms and labour market reforms on equilibrium rate of
unemployment and wage inequality in our stylitzed economy. We find that both these
reforms reduce equilibrium rate of unemployment. However, trade reforms raise wage
inequality but labour market reforms reduce it. These results provide a strong theoretical
basis for labour market reform in a small open economy characterized by frictional
labour market.
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21. Introduction:
Job-searching and job-matching are the two striking features of the labour market. In the
labour market, we find flows of workers, flows of jobs offered, new vacancies are
created, old jobs are destroyed, workers search good jobs, firms search good workers. All
these facts have been included in the matching models of the labour market. The job-
matching models generally explain the existence of equilibrium rate of unemployment
and give insights to the planners to pursue various economic policies in the fractional
labour market.
The benchmark model on the job-matching is the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (called
DMP hereafter) model. Other notable works include the models of Diamond (1982a,
1982b, 1984), Pissarides (1979, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 2000), Mortensen (1987),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1998, 1999), Sheng and Xu (2007) etc. All these models
emphasized the role of matching in the labour market. In reality, both the workers and the
firms search to meet each others. Production starts only when they are matched. But
matching is not an instantaneous process; rather it takes time and is costly. Matching
generates surplus which is distributed between workers and firm. The most commonly
used surplus-sharing rule is the Nash-bargaining solution.1
The matching function has been used first in the models of Hall (1979), Pissarides
(1979), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Bowden (1980). Matching function is described as
black-box where vacancies and unemployed workers jointly produce output.2
Empirically, it has been found that matching is a function of unemployment rate and
vacancy rate and is subject to CRS.3
In this paper, we develop a two-sector matching model in general equilibrium framework
along the line of DMP. Actually, we extend the DMP model in a two-sector general
equilibrium framework by incorporating a frictionless segment of the labour market.
Here, one sector has frictionless labour market where job-searching and job-matching are
1 In the standard literature, we also find wage-posting as a tool for the split of match surplus.
2 See Pissarides (2000).
3 The Cobb-Douglas type matching functions have been used by Blanchard et al. (1989),
Pissarides (2000) and Stevens (2007).
3instantaneous but in the other sector labour market is frictional and work like the DMP
model. The comparative static exercises of our analysis shows that both the trade reforms
and the labour market reforms soften the problem of unemployment and labour market
reform lowers wage inequality while trade reforms raise it in a small open economy
having frictional labour market. We also show that under the Hosios (1990) efficiency
condition, the equilibrium rate of unemployment would be lower if the elasticity of the
matching function is higher.
2. The Model:
We consider a two-sector small open economy. The two sectors are sector 1 which is the
export sector and produces commodity, 1X  and the other sector is the import-competing
sector 2 which produces commodity, 2X . The prices of the two commodities ,1 2P P are
given due to the small country assumption. The price of commodity 1 is chosen as
numeraire. The two sectors use both labour and capital in production. The production
functions are subject to CRS and diminishing marginal productivity. Capital is mobile
between the two sectors and this gives a unique rate of return on capital.
Labour is also mobile across the sectors but labour market is segmented. Both workers
and the firms search in both sectors.. But in one sector (sector 1), job-search and job-
match are instantaneous and so this sector is frictionless. Here, workers are paid
according to their marginal products. However, the other sector is frictional where
matchings are time consuming and costly. In this sector (sector 2) the two-way searching
gets fruitful after incurring some costs.
In the frictional labour market job-search is an ongoing process. Jobs are offered to the
workers and the workers arrive at the jobs offered. So, there exists job-matching between
workers and firm in sector 2. Following DMP we may consider the matching function
as  ,m m u v , where m  stands for matching, u is the rate of unemployment and v is the
vacancy rate and , 0, , 0, 01 2 11 22 12 21m m m m m m    . Total flow of matches is
4m au  and total flow of jobs is m vq . So, m a
u
  is the job arrival rate and m q
v
 is
the job offer rate. Matching function is assumed to possess CRS property and so we may
write    , m m vq q a q
u v u
      where v
u
  is the labour market tightness and
  0, 1q eq   .4
2.1 Value Equations:
The Bellman equations for the values of unemployment (U ), employment (W ), vacancy
(V ) and jobs filled in ( J ) are
  rU q W U   (1)
 2rW w W U                                                                       (2)
  rV C q J V                                                                                                        (3)
2 2 2rJ P t w rk J
                                                                            (4)
Equation (1) states that unemployment gives option of a discrete change in the valuation
from U to W .5 This equation holds at steady state where discount rate, transaction rate
and income flows are constant. Equation (2) embraces that the asset value of employment
is the wage rate in sector 2  2w  less employment gain when negative shock arises,
where  the job destruction rate which is  given exogenously. Equation (3) shows that the
asset value of vacancy yields, at the rate  q  , a discrete change in its valuation from
V to J less a given flow cost C to maintain vacancy. Finally, Equation (4) states that the
4 Note that in steady state ,  
1
q 
is the expected duration of vacancy and  
1
q 
is the expected
duration of unemployment (Pissarides, 2000).
5 We assume that there is no unemployment benefit.
5value of a job filled in is the flow of profit ( 2 2 2P t w rk
   ) to the firm less the jobs
destroyed where t  is the match productivity.6
2.2 Job-Creation Condition:
A firm creates jobs up to the point where 0V  . Putting this condition into Equation (3)
one gets
 
CJ
q 
                                                                                          (5)
Substituting (5) into (4) we can write
 
 2 2 2
r C
P t w rk
q


    (6)
This is the job-creation condition at steady state. This shows that at steady state,  value of
the product is equal to the wage cost plus rental cost plus recruitment cost of labour. 7
2.3 Wage function in the frictional Sector:
In the search and matching model, production begins when firm and workers are
matched. If the match is broken both of them again search and can produce after new
match. But the search is expensive which can be saved by staying together. So, match
generates surplus. This surplus can be shared by both the matched workers and firms. The
most commonly used surplus sharing rule is the Nash-bargaining solution. The Nash-
bargaining solution allocates surplus according to the returns from search on both sides.
The Nash-bargaining solution can be obtained from the following exercise:
    1
2
Max W U J V
w
    
                                                                                   (7)
6 We may assume full productivity of match i.e. 1t  .
7 Since each match produces output, value of the match coincides with the value of the product.
6Where  is the bargaining strength of the workers and 1 0  .
Assuming interior solutions exist, the first order condition is
   W U W U J V                                                                                                 (8)
This is the surplus sharing rule in search equilibrium. This rule states that at steady state
the net gain to the workers  W U  is equal to the fixed proportion,   of the total
surplus,  W U J V   .
Using Equations (1), (2), (4) and the zero-profit condition for the firm, 0V  , from (8)
we can get8
 2 2 2w P t C rk    (9)
This is the wage equation for the frictional sector. This shows that wage in frictional
sector depends positively on the productivity of the sector and on the market tightness,
given the discount rate, r .9
Now solving the two basic Equations (6) and (9) we can get the equilibrium values
of ,2w  .
2.4 Unemployment rate:
The conventional labour force is assumed to be fixed. Following Pissarides (2000) we
may derive the rate of unemployment in the following way:
Suppose, at time t unemployment is u
t
 and employment is  1 ut . In short time
interval t ,  q u tt t t    workers are matched and  1 u tt  lose their jobs. So,
unemployment in this interval is
   1u u q u t u tt t t t t t t                                                                                 (10)
8 See Appendix A.
9 At steady state, k is constant.
7   1u u q u t u tt t t t t t t         
   1
0
u u
t t tLt q u u
t t t ttt
   

         
   1u q u u                                     (11)
At steady state, 0u 

.
 u q

  
                                                                                                                 (12)
This is the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This is also known as the Beveridge curve
which shows an inverse relation between ,u , given . Putting the equilibrium value of
 into (12) we can get equilibriumu
2.5 The General Equilibrium Structure of the Model
The structure of the two-sector general equilibrium model consists of the following
equations:
The price equations of the two sectors are
11 1 1w a raL K                                                                                                    (13)
2 2 2 2w a ra PL K
                                                                                                         (14)
Where 2P

 is the tariff-inclusive price of the commodity 2. All aij are functions of
, 1, 2jw r j  .
The wage equation for the frictional sector is given by
     2 1
C
w rU r
q


 
                                                               (15)
8An unemployed worker in sector 2 either searches job in this sector or get employed in
sector 1. As job-seeker he gets unemployment income rU  and as worker in sector 1 he
gets wage, 1w . The no-arbitrage condition implies that in equilibrium,
1rU w                                                                                                                            (16)
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is
 u q

  
                                                                                                                   (17)
Labour is not fully employed but capital is fully employed. Thus, the two factor
endowment equations are
 11 1 2 2a X a X u LL L                                                                                                (18)
1 1 2 2a X a X KK K                                        (19)
Where ,L K  are the fixed supply of labour and capital respectively.
Using (1) and (16) into (13) and (14) one gets10
  11 1q a raL K     (13.1)
  2 2 2r q a ra PL K          (14.1)
Where    1
C
q


 
   is the frictional cost of labour in sector 2. We may write
 ,     with , 0    ( i is the elasticity of frictional cost of labour with respect to
i where , .i  
10 See Appendix A.
9Now we can determine the equilibrium values of seven endogenous variables:
, , , , , ,1 2 1 2w w r u X X from seven Equations (13.1), (14.1), (15)-(19). Solving (13.1) and
(14.1) we get equilibrium values of , r . Then, from (15), (16) and (17) we get , ,1 2w w u .
Finally, Equations (18) and (19) yield ,1 2X X .
3. Comparative Static Exercises:
Taking total differentials of Equations (13.1), (14.1), (15), (16) and after simplification
the following results can be obtained:11
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 1 2 10,   0ˆˆ
2
w w w w
P 
              
(20)
These results lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the presence of search friction in the labour market a fall in the tariff-
inclusive price of the commodity produced in the import-competing sector raises wage
inequality and a fall in the bargaining strength of the labour reduces it in a small open
economy.
We may give an intuitive explanation of proposition 1. Trade liberalization reduces 2P

. It
can be verified from Equations (13.1) and (14.1) that a fall in 2P

 leads to an increase in
  and a decrease in r . When   rises the average recruitment cost, C rises. As a result
value of unemployment, rU rises, given  . This, under the no-arbitrage condition,
implies that 1w also rises. From (14.1) it can be observed that 2w  also rises. Under the
capital-intensity condition,   01 2 1 2L K K L     2w  rises more than 1w . Therefore,
trade liberalization raises wage inequality in our small open economy where labour
11 See Appendix B Appendix C.
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market is frictional. On the contrary, a fall in the bargaining power of the labour raises
both , .r From (16) it can be verified that rU falls and so also 1w . From (14.1) it can be
observed that 2w  also falls. Here also the capital-intensity condition implies that 2w  falls
more than 1w . So, wage inequality decreases.
Taking total differentials of (17) and using (13.1), (14.1) and after simplification one
gets12
ˆ ˆ0, 0ˆˆ
2
u u
P 
            
  (21)
These results give the following proposition:
Proposition2: Both trade reform and labour market reform lower the equilibrium rate of
unemployment in a small open economy having frictional labour market.
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. From (13.1) and (14.1) it can be verified that a
fall in 2P

  and/  raises . From the Beveridge curve (Equation, 17) it is evident that
u must fall when   rises.
4. Efficiency and Matching Function:
One of the most important aspects of the DMP model is to determine the equilibrium rate
of unemployment in the frictional labour market. The social planner may question the
efficiency of this unemployment rate at the steady state equilibrium. Hosios (1990)
derived the condition under which the unemployment rate would be the efficient one. The
condition of efficiency is that the firm’s share to the match surplus is equal to the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancy rate i.e. 1 ve
m
   .
12 See Appendix B, Appendix C.
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It is generally agreed that the matching function is subject to the CRS. However,
Mortensen (2011) uses two types of matching functions: one is linear, 1 2m a u a v   and
the other is quadratic,  1 2m a a uv   where ,1 2a a  are constant terms. In the linear
case, 1ve
m
 . This implies that 1 0  and this is compatible to our model. On the other
hand, in the quadratic form of the matching function as considered by Mortensen (2011)
1.ve
m
 In this case 0   and in our set-up this implies that rU = w =0, =0.2 1w 
13
This shows that labour is like a free gift of nature which is purely utopian. Further, as the
value of ve
m
rises the value of   falls under the Hosios (1990) Efficiency condition. In
our set-up, low value of   implies high value of   which in turn gives low equilibrium
u and this leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Under the Hosios (1990) efficiency condition, we get an inverse relation
between the elasticity of the matching function and the equilibrium rate of
unemployment.
5. Concluding Remarks:
In this paper we extend the DMP model in general equilibrium framework. Like the DMP
model we also assume determination of wage rate in the frictional sector through the
Nash-bargaining solution. However, the marginal productivity rule is applied to
determine wage rate in the frictionless sector and the unique discount rate.
We introduce no-arbitrage condition in the labour market.14 Our theoretical analysis
shows that trade reform softens the problem of unemployment but raises wage inequality
in a small open economy characterized by search friction in the labour market. However,
13 In this situation wage posting may be considered as an alternative to the Nash-bargaining
solution and this may lead to a single wage equal to the reservation wage if only one wage is
offered (Pissarides, 2000).
14 See Sheng and Xu (2007) in this context.
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labour market reform lowers both wage inequality and equilibrium rate of
unemployment. Thus, our theoretical results provide a strong ground for labour market
reform and weak ground for trade reform in a small open economy where labour market
is frictional.
Finally, we again establish the role of the matching function in the determination of the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. We find that under the Hosios (1990) efficiency
condition,  the greater the elasticity of the matching function the smaller the equilibrium
rate of unemployment in the frictional sector.
Appendix A Derivation of Some Useful Expressions:
The Nash –bargaining problem is
    1
2
Max W U J V
w
    
                                                                                   (7)
The first order condition for maximization is
        1 0
2 2
J V W U W U J V
w w
 
                                                    (A.1)
Using (2), (4) and the zero-profit condition 0V   into (A.1) one gets
    1 2 2 2 2w rU P t w rk      
Or
   12 2 2w rU P t rk                                              (A.2)
Using (2), (5), (A.1) and V=0 from (1) we can write
 1
C
rU  

  (1.1)
Using (1.1) into (A.2) one gets
13
 2 2 2w P t C rk    (9)
Appendix B Effects of a Change in ,2P 

 on , , , ,1 2r w w u :
Using (1.1) from (16) we get
   1 1
C
w q    

  (A.3)
Using (1.1) into (15) we may get
      2 1
C
w r q
q

  
 
  
  r q       (A.4)
Taking total differentials of Equations (13.1) and (14.1) and after simplifications we get
ˆ ˆˆ1 1 1 1e e r eq L K L
       
                                         (A.5)
  ˆ ˆˆˆ1 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
q r
e e r P eq L L K Lw w
            
                    
                          (A.6)
Solving (A.5) and (A.6) we get
 
   
1ˆ ˆˆ
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2
rP eK L K K L L Lw
         
              
 
                                    (A.7)
       
1 1 ˆˆˆ 1 1 11 2 1 2
2
w
r e e P e eq L q L Lw
      
                       
   
                                     (A.8)
where
14
 1 12 2 1 2 1
2 2
qr
e eq q L K L q q L Kw w
           
                           
 
   
1 1 2
  1 01 2
2
        1 2 1
2
                               and 1 11 2 2 1
2
eq q L K
r
eq q L L qw
eq q L Kw
q
e eL K L K q q q qw
   
   
     
          
                              
              
  
     (A.9)
From (A.7)-(A.9) we get
 
       
ˆ ˆ1 10,  0ˆ1 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ 22
r
eK L K K L L LwP
          
               
                  (A.7.1)
           
ˆ ˆ1 1 11 0,   1 1 0ˆ1 1 2ˆ 22
wr r
e e e eq L q L LwP
     
                      
                       (A.8.1)
Again from (13) and (14) we get
1ˆ ˆ.1
1
Kw r
L


                                                        (A.10)
and
2ˆ ˆ.2
2
Kw r
L


                                                                                                               (A.11)
Using (A.10) and (A.11) we get
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 
 
2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ.2 1
2 1
K Kw w r
L L
 
 
       

                                                                                   (A.12)
Using (A.7.1), (A.8.1) from (A.12 one gets
 
   
ˆ ˆ ˆ2 1 2 1
. 0
2 12 2
w w rK K
P PL L
 
 
         
 
                                                                      (A.12.1)
 
   
ˆ ˆ ˆ2 1 2 1
. 0ˆ ˆ
2 1
w w rK K
L L
 
  
        
 
                                                                        (A.12.2)
Taking total differentials of (17) and after simplifying one gets
  ˆˆ 1 1u u eq                                                  (A.13)
Using (A.7.1) from (A.13) we get
 
   
ˆˆ
1 1 0
ˆ ˆ
2 2
u
u eqP P
        
 
                                                                                 (A.13.1)
 
   
ˆˆ
1 1 0ˆ ˆ
u
u eq

 
       
 
                                                          (A.13.2)
Appendix C: Effects of Changes in ,2p 
 on Sectoral Output
Taking total differentials of Equations (18) and (19) and using the definitions of the
elasticity of factor substitutions and after simplifications we get
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   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
ˆˆ ˆ
                                      11 1 1 2 2 2
X X w wL L L K L K
r u L uuL K L K
       
     
   
   
                          (A.14)
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
ˆˆ1 1 1 2 2 2
X X w wK K K L K L
r KK L K L
       
     
    
 
                                            (A.15)
Solving (A.14) and (A.15) by Cramer’s rule one gets
 
  
 
ˆ ˆ2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1ˆ ˆ1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
      1K2 2 2
w wK L K L K L K L
X rK L K L K L K L
u L K uuL K
         
         

  
               
                             (A.16)
 
  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
1ˆ ˆ2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ
                        11 1
K w wL L K L K L K L K
X rL K L K L K L K
u L uuK K
          
         

 
               
               (A.17)
where
  01 2 1 2L K K L        (Since sector 1is assumed to be labour-intensive vis-à-vis
sector 2).
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